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CHAPTER ONE 
Concepts and Definitions 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa that has been fortunate enough not to 
have experienced civil conflict due to relatively peaceful transitions of government, from a 
three-decade autocratic one-party state to a democratic multi-party state.1 At the time of 
Zambia’s independence from Great Britain in 1964, it was classified as a middle income 
country, which made it the second wealthiest country in sub-Saharan Africa.2 However, the 
status of being a middle income country did not last long and, like most countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, Zambia slipped into poverty and underdevelopment.3 This state of affairs 
has led to it becoming one of the major recipients of foreign aid.4  
Zambia has embarked on an economic diversification programme and has now attained the 
status of lower a middle income economy.5 Despite this turnabout, the economy still relies 
extensively on the mining industry and windfall gains from the copper mines,6 and Zambia 
remains one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa that is heavily dependent on aid7 while 
having to cope with a serious problem of corruption.8 
                                                          
1  Rakner (2012) 1. 
2  Werlin (2005) 518. 
3  Rakner (2012) 3. 
4  Beuran, Raballand & Revilla (2011) 5. 
5  World Bank (2014). 
6  African Development Bank Group (2014). 
7  Carlsson et al (2000) 6. 
8  Chêne (2014) 1. 
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The effectiveness of foreign aid in Zambia has been discussed by many scholars, either as an 
independent study9 or in relation to aid effectiveness in Africa,10 but linking the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in Zambia with problem of corruption has not been explored 
fully. 
This paper seeks to examine the relationship between foreign aid and corruption in Zambia. 
Drawing from the analysis of the two, it then explores whether the existing legal 
instruments are adequate and effective to combat corruption in the aid context. 
1.2 Structure of the Paper 
This paper is divided into four chapters. This Chapter constitutes the introduction, discusses 
the concepts of foreign aid and corruption and proposes definitions of both terms. It further 
provides an overview of these concepts in relation to Zambia and briefly discusses the anti-
corruption legal framework. 
Chapter Two reviews the literature on the nexus between foreign aid and corruption. It 
focuses on the relationship between the two in Zambia. The debate on aid effectiveness is 
discussed also.  
Chapter Three discusses the current anti-corruption legal instruments in Zambia and 
analyses their effectiveness and inadequacies in tackling the problem of grand corruption in 
foreign aid. Regional and international instruments to which Zambia is a State Party will be 
discussed here also.  
                                                          
9  See generally Beuran, Raballand & Revilla (2011) and Situmbeko & Zulu (2004). 
10  Werlin (2005). 
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Chapter Four will provide concluding observations and recommendations drawn from the 
research. 
1.3 Foreign Aid: Meaning and Scope 
The concept of foreign aid is not a novel one. In the 1940s, the Marshall Plan aimed to 
revive Europe in the aftermath of World War II (WWII) and prevent the growth of 
communist influence through the provision of foreign aid.11 The number of countries in 
need of aid dramatically increased with decolonisation and the needs of these 
underdeveloped countries differed significantly from those of post-WWII Europe.12 The shift 
from colonialism to independence resulted in changes in the ideas of development for 
underdeveloped countries. This, in turn, led to a change in the quantity of foreign aid that is 
provided, the providers of aid, the recipients, the modalities, as well as the purposes to 
which aid is put.13 
Thus, from the 1950s, foreign aid and development ideas focused on improving investment 
capabilities and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by building up the national savings 
rates of the underdeveloped countries.14 In the 1980s, the focus shifted to alleviating the 
heavy debt burden incurred through loans by underdeveloped countries.15 Contemporary 
foreign aid, since the 1990s, focuses on structural adjustment and poverty alleviation.16 
Foreign aid has been described as the voluntary international transfer of financial resources, 
goods or services from governmental, non-governmental, multinational and non-profit 
                                                          
11  Hjertholm & White (2000) 81. 
12  Bean (2010) 787-788. 
13  UNDP (2010) 147. 
14  Thorbecke (2004) 22. 
15  Moyo (2009) 19. 
16  Thorbecke (2004) 19-45. 
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organisations for the benefit of a recipient country or its population.17 There are three 
primary types of aid, namely, humanitarian aid, charitable aid and development aid.18 
Whereas the past six decades have seen more than $2.5 trillion expended on all forms of 
aid,19 the focus of this research is on development aid. 
The largest amount of foreign aid is development aid, made directly to receiving 
governments through government to government transfers (bilateral aid) or through 
transfers from multinational organisations to governments (multilateral aid). Development 
aid involves the transfer of financial resources in the form of concessional grants and loans 
and is administered in the form of official development assistance (ODA). More than $106 
billion in net ODA was disbursed in 200520 and by 2013 this figure had increased to $134 
billion.21 ODA contributes heavily to net capital inflows for most countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, making it the largest single source of capital inflow.22 Consequently, for purposes of 
this research the term “foreign aid” refers only to ODA. 
1.4 Zambia and Foreign Aid 
Zambia has been receiving foreign aid since attaining independence in the mid-1960s.23 Aid 
was provided initially in the form of technical support for government-sponsored projects.24 
However, the Zambian economy experienced a poor performance when the global 
economic depression of the 1970s caused the price of copper, which was Zambia’s main 
                                                          
17  Andvig et al (2000) 10. 
18  Moyo (2009) 7. 
19  Bean (2010) 782. 
20  OECD (2006).  
21  OECD (2014).  
22  Sundberg & Gelb (2006). 
23  Beuran, Raballand & Revilla (2011) 5. 
24  Beuran, Raballand & Revilla (2011) 5. 
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economic pipeline, to decline.25 The falling price of copper contributed to a trade deficit, 
rendering Zambia unable to meet its balance of payments obligations and causing it to 
amass huge debts.26 This bad debt record made it impossible for the country to borrow 
externally and the government turned to foreign aid in order to revive the economy.27 
Zambia borrowed heavily from the World Bank to sustain the copper mines, and improve 
the agriculture, education, infrastructure and health sectors.28 Its ineligibility to borrow at 
concessionary rates meant the loans from the World Bank were priced at commercial rates, 
which were very steep.29 
Another consequence of the decline in the price of copper and debt servicing was the 
considerable shortages of foreign exchange earnings.30 Foreign aid provided Zambia with 
inflows of foreign exchange which enabled it to raise the capital investment needed to 
maintain the copper industry.31 Thus, the reasons for providing aid to Zambia shifted from 
assisting government projects to sustaining the economy. 
Foreign aid has evolved “from a small trickle to become a virtual flood”.32 In 1992, 67% of 
export earnings and 77% of total public expenditure came from ODA.33 Foreign aid financed 
almost 80% of all of Zambia's capital expenditure.34 ODA per capita continued to trend 
upwards through the 1990s, reaching a high of more than $220 in 1995, which was almost 
                                                          
25  Saasa (2002) 66. 
26  Devarajan, Dollar & Holmgren (2001) 540. 
27  Rakner (2012) 3. 
28  Devarajan, Dollar & Holmgren (2001) 540. 
29  Biz/ed (2001). 
30  Biz/ed (2001). 
31  Biz/ed (2001). 
32  Carlsson et al (2000) vi. 
33  Devarajan, Dollar & Holmgren (2001) 540. 
34  Biz/ed (2001). 
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seven times the sub-Saharan average.35 ODA per capita levelled off from the mid-1990s to 
the mid-2000s due to reduced aid inflows, but it spiked again in 2006 to approximately $121 
following an increase in aid disbursements.36 Zambia currently receives foreign aid 
bilaterally from various donors, including Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, China, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA, and multilaterally from the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
ODA is susceptible to manipulation through the principle of conditionality which holds that 
certain policy conditions expressing donor ideologies must be met first. The loans obtained 
from the IMF and the World Bank in the 1970s and 1980s to support Zambia’s balance of 
payments difficulties were subject to strict conditions of macroeconomic stabilisation and 
structural adjustment.37 The government of the time boycotted the conditions which 
required it to privatise the economy, stop subsidies and restructure the social sector.38 
Some bilateral donors questioned the stringency of the conditions and increased their 
assistance when the IMF and World Bank imposed conditionality.39  
Recurring balance of payments difficulties in the 1990s shifted the focus to supporting 
balance of payments deficits.40 The aid was used to counter the balance of trade deficit and 
to repay Zambia's external debt that had grown considerably since the 1970s. Servicing 
Zambia's debt accounted for 80% of the balance of payments support that it received from 
its donors in the mid-1990s, despite considerable debt cancellation and rescheduling from 
                                                          
35  Beuran, Raballand & Revilla (2011) 6. 
36  Beuran, Raballand & Revilla (2011) 6. 
37  Rakner (2012) 3. 
38  Saasa (2002) 66. 
39  Biz/ed (2001). 
40  Saasa (2002) 69. 
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donors such as the grouping known as the Paris Club.41 The Paris Club agreed to write off 
67% of the debt and reschedule the remaining 33% on more concessional terms at the end 
of the 1990s.42 
Foreign aid over the last two decades has been tied to the implementation of economic 
policy reform.43 Bilateral donors stipulated liberalisation of external trade and payment 
systems, good governance, democratic government and human rights as conditions for 
granting foreign aid. Aid that was aimed at supporting the balance of payment deficits was 
being used as a tool to bring about political and economic change to such an extent that 
concerns about abuses of democracy led donors to withhold aid between 1996 and 1998.44 
These policies, however, have done nothing to improve the economic situation in Zambia. 
An example is the disastrous effect of trade liberalisation on Zambia’s manufacturing 
industry. The textile industry is nearly non-existent since it was unable to compete with 
imports of cheap second-hand clothes from industrialised countries that hit the market after 
the removal of tariffs on used clothes.45 Privatisation of state-owned entities led to 
plundering of resources, job losses due to retrenchment, and poverty.46 
Besides entrenching poverty, another major problem caused by foreign aid is the culture of 
aid dependency that it has caused to take root in Zambia.47 Aid, as a percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), has been exceptionally high and the ratio of Zambia’s Gross 
                                                          
41  Biz/ed (2001). 
42  Biz/ed (2001). 
43  Biz/ed (2001). 
44  Biz/ed (2001). 
45  Ndulo & Mudenda (2010) 293. 
46  Situmbeko & Zulu (2004) 7. 
47  Carlsson et al (2000) 6. 
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Domestic Investment (GDI) to aid is four times the average for sub-Saharan Africa.48 Foreign 
aid in relation to GDP has reduced markedly in recent times;49 however, there has been no 
increase in productivity in Zambia despite a drop in aid as a percentage of GDP.50 Callaghy 
writes that foreign aid dependency is simply a continuation of Africa’s economic 
marginalisation and dependence on the Western-dominated world economy.51 Also, foreign 
aid dependency has been identified as an impediment to economic and political growth 
because: 
The current aid system wastes much national energy and political capital in 
interacting with donor agencies, and distracts … governments from domestic debate 
and consensus building.52 
Foreign aid dependency has been perpetuated by attached conditions which undermine 
Zambia’s democracy and prevent the government from introducing development policies 
that are appropriate to the national situation.53 
Even though recent years have seen a decline in foreign aid to less than 5% of the national 
budget,54 Zambia still is dependent on aid in social sectors such as health and education. 
However, one can ask whether foreign aid really has been effective, considering the fact 
that 65% of the population continues to live below the poverty line.55 
 
                                                          
48  Carlsson et al (2000) 7. 
49  Rakner (2012) 2. 
50  Carlsson et al (2000) 7. 
51  Callaghy (1991) 44. 
52  Kunbar (2000) 419. 
53  SAPRIN (2004). 
54  Lusaka Times (2013). 
55  Carlsson et al (2000) 9. 
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1.5 Foreign Aid: Donor Intentions 
The question today is why aid is being given still, despite its apparent ineffectiveness. In 
fact, there have been calls for more aid to be given to Africa.56 One argument is that donors 
feel morally obligated to help the less fortunate.57 Another is the idea of neo-colonialism: 
powerful countries use aid as a route to controlling Africa and its natural resources.58 
It would be naïve to believe that foreign aid is given for purely developmental reasons. 
According to Hjertholm & White:  
Developmental objectives of foreign aid have been distorted by the use of aid for 
donor commercial and political advantage.59 
That aid is used as a weapon by donor countries for their own interests is no secret, as can 
be seen in former US President Nixon’s pronouncement in 1968 that: 
The main purpose of aid is not to help other nations but to help ourselves.60 
Most aid has been tied to the condition of importing goods from the donor country or 
implementing policies that favour citizens of donor countries conducting business in the 
recipient country. 
1.6 Corruption: Meaning and Scope 
Corruption is a deep-rooted global phenomenon but defining it is not an easy task, given the 
complex and multi-faceted ways in which it manifests itself. Rose-Ackerman notes that 
                                                          
56  See generally Sachs (2005). 
57  Anslow (2012).  
58  Hayter (1971) 7. 
59  Hjertholm & White (2000) 25. 
60  Cited in Kapoor (2008) 85. 
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“corruption is a term whose meaning shifts with the speaker”.61 In terms of Zambian 
legislation: 
Corruption means the soliciting, accepting, obtaining, giving, promising or offering of 
a gratification by way of a bribe or other personal temptation or inducement, or the 
misuse or abuse of a public office for advantage or benefit for oneself or another 
person.62 
This definition seems to be in line with the World Bank’s approach, which defines corruption 
as “the abuse of public office for private gain”.63 
Corruption takes many forms, including bureaucratic and grand corruption. This paper 
focuses on corruption in the foreign aid context. Thus, the focus here is on grand corruption, 
that is, the embezzlement, theft and diversion of substantial funds by government officials 
responsible for administering aid.64 
Like cancer, corruption spreads and stifles economic growth, and commonly is associated 
with poverty, inequality and social instability. In the 1990s, corruption was estimated to cost 
African economies a sum total of $148 billion.65 An international convention states that 
corruption: 
Represents a major threat to the rule of law, democracy and human rights, fairness 
and social justice, hinders economic development and endangers the proper and fair 
functioning of market economies.66 
                                                          
61  Rose-Ackerman (2004) 1. 
62  Section 3 of the Anti-Corruption Act 3 of 2012. 
63  Tanzi (1998) 8. 
64  Mugarura (2012) 126-127. 
65  Kimenyi & Mbaku (2011) 31. 
66  Preamble to the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, 1999. 
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1.7 Corruption in Zambia  
Sub-Saharan Africa has been named as one of the most corrupt regions in the world, despite 
having ample legal instruments to fight corruption.67 Like most of the countries in the 
region, corruption remains one of Zambia’s biggest challenges, after the cost of living and 
inflation.68 It is a problem with which Zambia has grappled since independence, but the 
prevalence of corruption was exceptionally high during the period 1991 to 2001.69 
1.7.1 Causes of Corruption 
According to Mbao, the present day frenzied looting of national wealth literally was unheard 
of in the early days of post-colonial Zambia.70 However, no empirical evidence exists on the 
causes and drivers of corruption in Zambia.71 Privatisation of state owned companies has 
been cited as a source of the high-level corruption cases that are prevalent today.72 It is 
agreed that liberalisation in the 1990s introduced a new culture of corruption into Zambia.73 
In the 2013 worldwide Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Zambia ranked 83 out of the 177 
countries polled, with an index of 38 points out of 100.74 This shows that Zambia is not the 
most corrupt nation in the world, but corruption in the country is believed still to be 
widespread.75 Nearly half of the households surveyed in the Global Corruption Barometer 
(GCB) of 2013 perceived the levels of corruption in Zambia to have increased over the last 
                                                          
67  TI CPI (2013). 
68  NORAD Report (2011) xv. 
69  Mbao (2011) 261. 
70  Mbao (2011) 268. 
71  NORAD Report (2011) xv. 
72  NORAD Report (2011) 14. 
73  NORAD Report (2011) 14. 
74  TI CPI (2013). 
75  Chêne (2014) 4. 
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three years.76 Zambia saw an increase in reports of corruption from 1571 to 2075 between 
the years 2005 and 2009.77 
The causes of these high levels of corruption are many and varied, ranging from low salaries 
for public officials, through lack of transparency and accountability in political processes and 
poor governance to cultural factors, lack of an independent and effective media and lack of 
an independent and effective judiciary.78 
1.7.2 Forms of Corruption 
The types of corruption in Zambia range from petty or administrative cases of bribery to 
grand or political corruption entailing the plundering of public resources mainly by senior 
public officials. Favouritism or nepotism is also prevalent in Zambia. 
Petty corruption in the form of bribes is widespread and the most obvious form of 
corruption in Zambia.79 Citizens have to pay bribes in order to obtain basic services such as 
passports or birth certificates from government departments. According to the 2012 
Transparency International (TI) Zambia Bribe Payers Index, people in positions of influence 
or authority do not perceive any inhibition on accepting bribes for doing what they are 
employed to do. It is a common occurrence to obtain medicines by bribing corrupt officials 
because diversion of public resources has led to a scarcity of medicines.  
Political corruption is also rampant in Zambia.80 Increased political competition has given 
rise to vote-buying during election time. Public resources are abused by the ruling party to 
                                                          
76  Transparency International GCB Report (2013). 
77  Anti-Corruption Commission Reports (2005-2009). 
78  Mbao (2011) 261. 
79  NORAD Report (2011) 12. 
80  NORAD Report (2011) 14. 
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finance campaigns such as purchasing new vehicles and bicycles.81 Government leaders 
make donations to schools, community projects, community-based organisations and faith-
based groups during election campaigns.82 Food and clothing are distributed to potential 
voters when elections have been called.83 Former President Rupiah Banda distributed food 
and subsidised fertilizer to the electorate when he was campaigning for the presidency in 
2008.84 
Grand corruption in respect of public resources by public officials and politically connected 
individuals is endemic in Zambia. The prominent actors and network of plunderers are 
documented well in the case of Attorney-General for Zambia v Meer Care and Desai.85 The 
alleged theft of an estimated $52 million by former President Chiluba is another example of 
grand corruption.86 His wife, Regina Chiluba, allegedly received gifts to the value of         
$352 000.87 She was convicted of theft and sentenced to three-and-a-half years’ 
imprisonment for illegally receiving these gifts from her husband while he served as 
president. The conviction was overturned by the Lusaka High Court and the prosecution 
declined to appeal the case.88 
The consequences of corruption in Zambia are plain to see and range from bad roads and 
dilapidated schools with few qualified teachers and no textbooks, to run-down hospitals 
which are overflowing with patients but have few qualified doctors and no medicines and 
equipment.  
                                                          
81  Mbao (2011) 262. 
82  Mbao (2011) 262. 
83  Simutanyi (2010) 4. 
84  Simutanyi (2010) 6. 
85  Attorney-General for Zambia v Meer Care and Desai and Others HC04CO3129 [2007] EWHC 952. 
86  Simser (2010) 323. 
87  Mbao (2011) 262. 
88  US Department of State Human Rights Report: Zambia (2009). 
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1.7.3 Corruption Cases 
A number of corruption cases involving bribery and kickbacks have been reported and 
prosecuted. For instance, the Lusaka High Court upheld the judgment of a lower court in the 
case of the former permanent secretary at the Ministry of Health (MoH), Kashiwa Bulaya. 
He was charged with abuse of office and theft, convicted in 2007 and sentenced to five 
years’ imprisonment.89 Bulaya allegedly had disregarded tender procedures when he 
granted a tender to a Bulgarian firm called Butico A1 for the supply of a drug at a cost of 
more than Zambian Kwacha (ZMK) 4 billion. Bulaya was alleged to have received more than 
ZMK11 million from Butico A1’s chief executive officer as an inducement or reward for 
engaging the company to supply the drug to the MoH, and a sum in excess of ZMK9 million 
for supplying the drug.90 
The High Court also reviewed a case in which a former military commander, found guilty on 
two counts of corruption, was given a two-year suspended sentence on account of ill health 
and was ordered to repay the state the ZMK111 million ($30 000) that he received as a 
kickback from the British company engaged to supply uniforms to the Zambia National 
Service. The High Court overturned the order and sentenced the accused to nine months’ 
imprisonment with hard labour.91 
                                                          
89  Lusaka Times (2008).  
90  OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 3 Report on Bulgaria (2011). 
91  Lusaka Times (2008).  
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Bribery has been reported also in multilateral aid projects. The World Bank debarred two 
subsidiaries of Alstom, a power and transport systems firm, for bribing a Zambian public 
official concerning operations in Zambia for a project financed by the World Bank.92 
1.8 Combating Corruption 
The complex nature of corruption has not made the identification and implementation of 
effective anti-corruption strategies easy. This multifaceted character of corruption dictates 
that the efforts employed to fight it be multifaceted also. Legal and non-legal methods need 
to be used to deter the commission of corruption and to prevent offenders from enjoying 
their criminal proceeds where the offence is committed.  
The international donor community, including the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), as well as intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the 
African Union (AU), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), recognised that any aid programme that does not make anti-corruption efforts a 
priority is doomed to fail, and thus introduced numerous measures to combat and prevent 
corruption. These included tying aid to conditions that require the recipient country to pass 
domestic anti-corruption laws and encouraging recipient countries to ratify international 
treaties such as the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). 
Zambia has a range of laws and designated institutions for enforcing anti-corruption 
measures. A Corrupt Practices Act has existed in Zambia since 1980.93 The Act established 
the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which is charged with the prevention, investigation 
                                                          
92  All Africa (2012).  
93  Corrupt Practices Act 14 of 1980. 
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and prosecution of corruption. The government has made some attempt to strengthen the 
anti-corruption legal framework, including revising the procurement laws to increase 
transparency, and there is some good practice regarding the criminalisation of bribery and 
money laundering, protection of whistleblowers, and mutual legal assistance. For example, 
the Anti-Corruption Act 3 of 2012 was enacted to repeal the main anti-corruption law, the 
Anti-Corruption Act 38 of 2010, in order to comply with UNCAC. Another law enacted to 
reflect compliance with UNCAC is the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act 19 of 2010, which 
creates mechanisms for complying with Chapter V of UNCAC on asset recovery. The Public 
Finance Act 15 of 2004 designates all forms of aid as public funds to be paid into the 
Treasury Account for the credit of the Consolidated Fund.94 Zambia is also a state party to 
the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU Convention) 
and the Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (SADC 
Protocol). 
Zambia is said to have made progress in the fight against corruption under the leadership of 
the late President Mwanawasa, whose measures included the formation of the Task Force 
on Corruption (TFC) in 2002. The TFC investigated abuse of authority, mismanagement of 
public funds, theft of government resources, money laundering and corruption between 
1991 and 2001 and it also investigated the ruling government officials.95 President 
Mwanawasa’s successor, Rupiah Banda, ordered all ministries and public agencies to be 
audited and launched the National Anti-Corruption Policy. 
                                                          
94  Section 28(1) of the Public Finance Act 15 of 2004. 
95  NORAD (2011) 15. 
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Most of these efforts, however, have fallen prey to the overwhelming power of the 
executive branch. The TFC was disbanded after Mwanawasa’s death by the new President. 
The Zambian President, by law, has the power singlehandedly to appoint the Commissioners 
of the ACC, its Director General and the Deputy. Cases that do manage to reach the courts 
are not dealt with adequately. Whether these laws can be said to be sufficient to tackle the 
problem of grand corruption in foreign aid is what this study seeks to investigate. 
1.9 Foreign Aid and Corruption 
Corruption in recipient countries is used often as a reason to cut aid flows, but the debate 
on foreign aid and corruption is a controversial one. Those advocating for aid argue that it 
does not have a negative impact on corruption and find no relationship between the two. 
Opponents are of the view that it exacerbates corruption and the very problems it is 
intended to solve.  
The next chapter considers the relationship between foreign aid and corruption and the 
debate on aid effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Nexus between Foreign Aid and Corruption 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Individually, foreign aid and corruption, as subjects, have garnered lots of interest among 
academics, resulting in a wealth of literature. Recent times have seen renewed interest in 
corruption, which has led donor countries to pay more attention to cases in which aid funds 
have been diverted from their intended purposes.1 Hence, it is surprising that relatively few 
works have investigated the nexus between them. On the one hand, academic papers that 
address the general causes of corruption tend to focus on standard economic, political and 
social factors,2 with foreign aid receiving little attention. On the other hand, studies on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid have failed to explore fully the impact of corruption on aid 
effectiveness. 
This chapter analyses the theories on foreign aid and corruption, using Zambia as a case 
study. The debate on aid effectiveness will be discussed in the course of the analysis.  
2.2 Impact of Foreign Aid on Corruption 
According to Ampratwum, policies are confounded by measures that should be undertaken 
to prevent corruption from distorting government expenditure.3 This issue now forms the 
                                                          
1  Ampratwum (2008) 81. 
2  See generally Treisman (2000) and Serra (2004). 
3  Ampratwum (2008) 83. 
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main concern of donors about the possible misuse of aid funds.4 Ampratwum argues that 
foreign aid facilitates corruption because it is fungible.5 Foreign aid funds are easily stolen, 
redirected or extracted because:  
The marginal increase in public expenditure in response to aid inflows is not the 
expenditure towards which the aid was targeted.6 
Foreign aid has been cited as a facilitator of corruption because:  
“Foreign aid increases the size of resources fought over by interest groups [and] 
delays the adoption of policy reforms”.7 
Alesina & Weder examine whether the less corrupt governments receive an increase in 
foreign aid and find that they do not. Instead, it is the more corrupt governments that 
receive more aid.8 They also find that an increase in aid inflow tends to increase corruption 
and not assist in its reduction.9 In his analysis of whether foreign aid corrupts, Tavares 
points out the following: 
Foreign aid provides a ripe territory for corruption [since] aid disbursements are 
typically handed free to local authorities that then distribute them, with 
considerable discretion, among their fellow citizens.10 
In contrast to Alesina & Weder, Tavares uses conditionality effect and liquidity effect to 
conclude that aid decreases corruption.11 
                                                          
4  Ampratwum (2008) 83. 
5  Ampratwum (2008) 83.  
6  Ampratwum (2008) 83. 
7  Alesina & Weder (2002) 3. 
8  Alesina & Weder (2002) 3. 
9  Alesina & Weder (2002) 1128. 
10  Tavares (2003) 101. 
11  Tavares (2003) 104. 
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Donors allege that democratisation is a channel for addressing corruption and insist on it as 
a condition for granting aid.12 The argument is that democratisation facilitates greater 
transparency and accountability in government proceedings which can be used to tackle and 
contain corruption.13 However, the study by Alesina & Weder illustrates that donors do not 
pay attention to institutional quality or corruption considerations in their aid allocation 
decisions. This is corroborated by Alesina & Dollar who provide evidence that aid inflows by 
bilateral donors do not follow concerns over good governance in the recipient country but 
rather are dictated by the cultural and historical ties between donor country and recipient 
country.14 In other words, colonial history, as opposed to political institutions or economic 
policies of the recipient governments, is the determinant of more aid allocation.15 Alesina & 
Dollar also find that some bilateral donors, who are free from specific political pressure 
because they do not have colonial ties, do show a tendency to discriminate in favour of less 
corrupt governments, but they remain the exception rather than the rule,16 and 
international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank that dispense multilateral 
aid do not show any discriminatory tendencies regarding corruption in the recipient 
country.17 
Thus, the undiscriminating nature of aid allocation has a direct impact on governance 
through its tendency to perpetuate existing corruption in recipient countries. Foreign aid 
appears to increase the size of funds at the disposal of corrupt government officials and 
kleptocratic elites, considering the fact that the largest recipients of ODA in sub-Saharan 
                                                          
12  Ampratwum (2008) 82. 
13  Williams & Beare (2000) 123. 
14  Alesina & Dollar (2002) 36. 
15  Alesina & Dollar (2002) 45-46. 
16  Alesina & Dollar (2002) 50. 
17  Alesina & Dollar (2002) 56. 
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Africa rank very low globally in areas of governance and, particularly, corruption. This effect 
is corroborated by Knack who examines the relationship between foreign aid and good 
governance and finds that higher aid levels cause recipient countries to have low 
accountability, more rent-seeking opportunities and corruption as authorities fight over 
control of aid funds.18 
Ali & Isse find that foreign aid is correlated positively with corruption to a significant extent. 
They argue that ODA “strengthens the predatory power of the government and thus 
undermines the emergence of the private sector”.19 Foreign aid usually translates into 
greater government consumption due to its fungibility. Foreign aid “creates opportunities 
for the government to proliferate, which in turn increases corruption”.20 In the same vein, 
Lane & Tornell, in their study on foreign aid and corruption, argue that corruption in 
governments is encouraged by foreign aid.21 Okada & Samreth, however, hold the view that 
ODA reduces corruption. By using quantile regressions, they find that the reduction in 
corruption is “larger in countries with low levels of corruption”.22 
According to Moyo, Africa flounders in a never-ending cycle of corruption because of aid.23 
She writes that “foreign aid props up corrupt governments, providing them with usable 
cash”.24 The problem with such corrupt governments is that: 
They interfere with rule of law, the establishment of transparent civil institutions and 
the protection of civil liberties making foreign and domestic investment unattractive 
… which continues the downward spiral of poverty.25 
                                                          
18  Knack (2001) 313. 
19  Ali & Isse (2003) 460. 
20  Ali & Isse (2003) 460. 
21  Lane & Tornell (1996). 
22  Okada  & Samreth (2011) 4. 
23  Moyo (2009) 7. 
24  Moyo (2009) 49. 
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In her opinion, Africa should be weaned off foreign aid and international markets should be 
opened up. Supporting her proposition is Kenyan economist Shikwati, who argues that 
foreign aid finances bureaucracies and promotes corruption and complacency.26 According 
to him, development aid is one of the reasons for Africa’s problems and therefore should be 
eradicated out entirely.27 Former Ghanaian President Kufuor strongly disagrees with this 
contention. He argues that aid is necessary and it works.28 He opines that donors rather 
should monitor aid spending on a case-by-case basis.29 
Foreign aid can give rise to corruption if funds are not handled properly. Despite foreign aid 
being given for good intentions, no dramatic improvements have been made in reducing 
corruption. It is not a coincidence that recipient countries remain the poorest and the most 
corrupt despite billions in development aid having been spent on them. This is because 
foreign aid provides funds that are readily available and easily accessible for embezzlement 
by corrupt public officials. Most of the funds will not be accounted for and, in instances 
where they are, the responsible officials will go to great lengths to make an effort to falsify 
the records in order to create the impression that the funds are being used for their 
intended purposes corruption in foreign aid is exacerbated. Thus, the funds are stolen in a 
systematic manner for personal gain. Admittedly, not all aid fosters corruption but it is true 
that the bulk of aid has provided plunder opportunities for the elite to enrich themselves at 
the expense of the ordinary citizen. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
25  Moyo (2009) 49. 
26  Cited in Spiegel (2005). 
27  Cited in Spiegel (2005). 
28  Cited in Schenkel (2009). 
29  Cited in Schenkel (2009). 
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2.3 Impact of Corruption on Foreign Aid 
Corruption can have a significant impact on foreign aid. It is agreed generally that 
development aid is diverted from its intended purposes, with an estimated $130 billion lent 
to developing countries by the World Bank being used for corrupt purposes.30 Incentive 
misalignments mean that aid money does not reach its desired destination always; corrupt 
government officials line their pockets with money intended for development projects. This 
diversion of aid away from its intended purposes and beneficiaries directly weakens the 
realisation of its rationale.  
Corruption can have an indirect impact also on aid effectiveness by promoting inappropriate 
uses of aid. It erodes the effectiveness of foreign aid by impeding its proper allocation.31 The 
reduction of poverty, which is the aim of foreign aid, is undermined by the active corruption 
of public officials entrusted with development resources.  
Development aid allocated for education and skills enhancement, the building of regulatory 
and self-sustaining institutions, and improving the livelihoods of the poor is compromised in 
environments where corruption is pervasive and economic survival and opportunities are 
dependent on a system of bribe giving and taking. Corruption has been identified as a 
challenge in aid-funded development programmes. Studies have shown that there is a nexus 
between the quality of governance in recipient countries and the effectiveness of foreign 
aid.32 
Bean, however, points out that: 
                                                          
30  Moyo (2009) 52. 
31  Schudel (2008) 510. 
32  See Knack (2000). 
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Empirical research has not found that corruption is a major impediment to the 
effectiveness of economic development aid.33 
He concludes that: 
There is no persuasive evidence that corruption in the form of diversion or 
embezzlement accounts for the failure of aid.34 
The debates on the effectiveness of foreign aid, governance and corruption have been 
informed by the considerable aid funds that have reached beneficiaries free of corruption, 
as well as by the experience with corruption.35 
2.4 Foreign Aid and Corruption in Zambia 
Calculations based on the World Bank’s theoretical models show that if predictions had 
been correct, foreign aid transfers, which began in the 1960s, should have pushed Zambia’s 
per capita annual income to more than $20 000 today.36 In practice, however, Zambian 
income per capita has stagnated at around $600 for years. There is no evidence of a positive 
relationship between aid and economic development, despite structural adjustment 
programmes and policy reforms being undertaken. Instead, Zambia has grown an 
insurmountable debt that it has been struggling to repay, and aid inflows continued even 
though the government failed to meet the conditions set out for granting the aid. Saasa & 
Carlsson have pointed out that: 
                                                          
33  Bean (2010) 790. 
34  Bean (2010) 800. 
35  Transparency International Policy Paper (2007). 
36  Abuzeid (2009) 17. 
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Aid was primarily being used to repay money owed to largely the same countries and 
institutions that [were] providing the aid.37 
Thus, about 65% of the Zambian population has lived and continues to live below the 
poverty line, unable to cope with the constraints brought about by the trade liberalisation, 
investment deregulation, privatisation and abolition of subsidies demanded by donors. 
Zambia provides a stark example of the failure of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa, in spite 
of arguments that aid to Africa has been successful because it encourages investment.38 
Moyo refers to Africa’s “insidious aid culture” as an “unmitigated political, economic and 
humanitarian disaster”39 and Bean illustrates that aid has failed to produce sustainable 
economic growth.40 Has the rampant corruption in Zambia been the cause of this failure? 
The recent corruption scandals that have dominated news headlines in Zambia are not a 
new phenomenon. Corruption scandals have rocked Zambia since independence.41 Most of 
these corruption cases have involved the grand theft of foreign aid meant for developing 
Zambia and improving the livelihoods of the people. One example is the Kanyama Flood 
Disaster Fund scandal. In 1978, President Kaunda set up the Disaster Relief Fund in response 
to floods caused by unusually high rainfall countrywide. The Fund received more than    
$750 000 in supplementary funds from the US government, other donor governments, 
private individuals and local organisations.42 An increase in the floods in 1979 that caused 
immense damage to homes and property in Kanyama Township prompted the President to 
establish the Kanyama Flood Disaster Fund (KFDF) to assist the Kanyama flood victims. The 
                                                          
37  Saasa & Carlsson (1996) 160. 
38  Loxley & Sackey (2008) 190. 
39  Moyo (2009) xix. 
40  Bean (2010) 801. 
41  See Chapter One where general corruption scandals have been discussed. 
42  USAID Report (1979 ) 2.  
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KFDF was financed by funds from the Disaster Relief Fund. Scandal rocked the KFDF in 1980 
when it was discovered that senior government officials had misappropriated money from 
the fund and materials donated to the victims.43 Other reported incidents of corruption in 
the Foreign Service involved diplomats demanding kickbacks from aid that was earmarked 
for Zambia.44 Former Finance Minister, the late Ronald Penza, once refused to release 
constitutional development funds amidst concerns that the funds were being pocketed by 
Members of Parliament and not reaching the intended beneficiaries.45 The government 
showed its intolerance of corruption by dismissing senior government officials and civil 
servants charged with corruption.46 
In 1998, Medical Stores Limited (MSL), the government agency tasked with storage and 
distribution of drugs and medical equipment, including those funded by donors, was 
commercialised via tender. Donors raised concerns about the tendering process, regarding 
it as irregular due to lack of transparency in the awarding of the tender and the high fee 
involved. Consequently, Sweden withdrew its support for the supply of health centre drug 
kits and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) funded an alternative 
storage and distribution system.47 
As noted above, Zambia has a history of corruption involving the embezzlement of donor-
given financial aid. More recently, in 2010, the widespread allegations of grand theft in the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) sparked an international outcry against the high corruption levels 
in public office in Zambia. An inquiry by the Auditor General led to the discovery of 
                                                          
43  Chikulo (2000) 163. 
44  Chikulo (2000) 163. 
45  Chikulo (2000) 170. 
46  Chikulo (2000) 175. 
47  Vibe et al (2013) 64. 
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misappropriation of funds in excess of $7 million.48 More than $3 million of the 
misappropriated funds were given to Zambia in grants by the Global Fund organisation to 
fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.49 The grant aims to strengthen Zambia’s health 
system, pay for diagnostics and for the purchase of mosquito nets, HIV/AIDS anti-retroviral 
drugs and treatment of tuberculosis. A separate investigation by Global Fund discovered 
that there were certain irregularities and poor financial management not only in the 
ministry but also in three other organisations that received grants from the Fund. It was 
ascertained that the missing funds in the ministry amounted to more than $10 million.50 The 
Global Fund investigation revealed that the financial mismanagement included the purchase 
of vehicles for personal use, salaries that were above market value and disbursements to 
sub-recipients who failed to provide auditors with financial records.51 This prompted Global 
Fund to suspend more than $300 million in grants.52 
The ACC announced that it was investigating these allegations of embezzlement involving 32 
ministry officials.53 In 2010, the government reportedly arrested seven MoH officials in 
connection with the alleged embezzlement, including the former Human Resource 
Manager, Henry Kapoko.54 Kapoko and eight other employees from the MoH subsequently 
were charged with the crimes of theft by public servant, theft and money laundering. They 
were alleged to have intended to defraud the MoH of ZMK1.9 billion by falsely pretending 
to have ordered and shipped 50 000 mother-baby kits, when in fact they had not.55 Most of 
                                                          
48  Irin News (2011). 
49  Irin News (2011). 
50  Irin News (2011). 
51  Irin News (2011). 
52  BBC News Africa (2010) 
53  Lusaka Times (2010). 
54  US Department of State Human Rights Report: Zambia (2009) 
55  Post Newspaper (2012). 
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the prosecutions have led to acquittals, while other officials, including senior management, 
were suspended or dismissed.56 
Another prominent embezzlement case that forced several donor countries to suspend aid 
in the same period was the grand theft of funds from the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) that occurred also within the MoH. In November 2010, it was 
reported that CIDA had lost $880 000 as a result of corruption.57 The embezzled funds were 
meant to develop and improve the capacities and livelihoods of the people in rural and 
remote areas who did not have easy access to proper health care services. The corruption 
scandals in the MoH caused several donors to suspend aid commitments in other sectors. 
The European Union (EU) and Denmark suspended $65 million in aid meant for the 
development of Zambia’s road infrastructure.58 The Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning had to reimburse donors for misapplied or unaccounted funds meant for public 
service reform. 
The Zambia National AIDS Network (ZNAN) was appointed to be a principle recipient of aid 
funds from Global Fund in 2003 and funds from other donors were organised also. ZNAN 
promotes liaison, collaboration and co-ordination among non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and CSOs who are involved in the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS. ZNAN 
provides sub-grants to these organisations. An audit in 2009 revealed fraud and 
misappropriation at the sub-recipient level of funds totalling $1.6 million. In some cases, 
ZNAN salaries surpassed the salaries of similar organisations by 150% and management was 
provided with personal cars. ZNAN sponsored participation in international conferences that 
                                                          
56  Zambia Daily Nation (2012). 
57  Probe International (2010). 
58  Probe International (2010). 
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was not budgeted for and trips that did not relate to the organisation’s work. Also, the 
tendering process was marred by severe irregularities. The audit recommended that all 
missing monies be refunded to Global Fund. No individuals were held accountable for this 
misappropriation.59 
Foreign aid has provided a means for elite government officials to transform themselves 
from struggling citizens into instant millionaires. The case of former President Chiluba brings 
corruption in government to the fore.60 In a 2002 parliamentary address, the incumbent 
President, Levy Mwanawasa, alleged embezzlement and theft of up to $80 million by former 
President Fredrick Chiluba during his tenure.61 Yet aid inflows during that period were 
increased.62 Chiluba subsequently was charged with abuse of office and embezzlement of 
public funds in the sum of $500 000. However, his prosecution resulted in an acquittal on all 
counts, because the court found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the funds in 
question where from the National Treasury.63 Surprisingly, his co-accused in the matter, 
Faustin Kabwe and Aaron Chungu, were convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to five 
years’ imprisonment each.64 
Another co-accused, former permanent secretary in the Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning (MoFNP), Stella Chibanda, was arrested and charged with being in possession of 
unexplained wealth amounting to ZMK2 billion.65 Chibanda, who was an agent for the 
                                                          
59  OIG Report (2010) 59-63. 
60  The Attorney General v Fredrick Titus Jacob Chiluba and Others, 2007/HP/HC 004. 
61  See Moyo (2009) 53. Chiluba held office from 1991 to 2001. 
62  Moyo (2009) 53. 
63  Mbao (2011) 266. 
64  Dugger (2009). 
65  Kayumba (2002). 
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Zambia Intelligence Services (ZIS),66 was approached by former Chief of Intelligence, Xavier 
Chungu, to ensure that the debts of the previous regime are cleared by including them in 
the external debt servicing. He assured her that international financial institutions and 
donors who monitored public finances, such as the IMF, would not notice this.67 Chibanda 
testified that she was paid for services rendered to the ZIS and bank statements revealed 
that Chibanda had received monies from the infamous ZAMTROP account.68 
Most of these embezzled funds are siphoned back to Western banks by these corrupt 
leaders, negatively affecting the effectiveness of the aid. Reportedly $620 671 were 
transferred to foreign banks between 1995 and 1996.69 The civil case against Chiluba 
revealed the transfer of embezzled funds to accounts in London, Geneva, Brussels and the 
Channel Islands.70 
Corruption in foreign aid has dire consequences for the general population and for Zambia 
as a whole. The grand theft of aid funds has meant that their intended purpose is not 
addressed. Resources are directed to issues of lower priorities that are of no economic 
value, such as purchase of government vehicles, and diverted from areas that badly need 
aid, such as a clean water supply, hospitals, good and safe roads, and schools. For example, 
misappropriation of aid intended to develop roads has left Zambia with poor road 
infrastructures that flood every rainy season.71 The flooding of Kanyama Township is now so 
common an occurrence that its residents have come to expect it when it rains. The MoH 
                                                          
66  AllAfrica (2009). 
67  van Donge (2009)81. 
68  Kayumba (2002). 
69  Chikulo (2000) 167. 
70  The Attorney-General v Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba and Others, 2007/HP/HC 004. 
71  Probe International (2010). The EU suspended aid for road construction amid allegations of 
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case is another example of the negative impact of corruption on aid effectiveness. The 
grand theft of money meant to enhance the health care system pertaining to HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis, led to shortages of drugs used in the treatment of these diseases, 
causing deaths that could have been prevented.72 Development aid meant for the training 
of personnel has lined the pockets of those in charge and led to a shortage of skilled 
personnel in critical sectors.73 Implementation of policies has become redundant because 
money is used for other purposes.  
Misappropriation of aid has caused the price of goods and services to soar in Zambia. This is 
because aid is channelled to unproductive projects or it is used for personal enrichment. The 
transformation of public funds into personal property has led to employment in the public 
sector now being the ultimate goal, because people see such employment as a means of 
transforming their lives. Thus, the vicious cycle of poverty is perpetuated as aid 
effectiveness is undermined by the pursuit of employment in government in order to 
benefit from aid funds. The already agonisingly slow pace of service delivery will become 
worse, compromising the day-to-day welfare of ordinary Zambians.74 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Canada condemned these incidents of grand theft and were 
among several donor countries that suspended foreign aid to Zambia in response. It is clear 
that donors refuse to be associated with a country where foreign aid meant for 
development and poverty reduction is embezzled for personal use by those tasked with its 
disbursement, and in some cases their subordinates. Zambia was urged to crack down on 
corrupt leaders and strengthen its anti-corruption regime. The question that arises is 
                                                          
72  Irin News (2011). 
73  Canada’s aid to Zambia was intended to help train and recruit more staff for hospitals and health 
programmes. 
74  Irin News (2011). 
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whether the anti-corruption laws in place are adequate and effective. The next chapter 
addresses the legal instruments available for combating corruption in the aid context.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Foreign Aid and Anti-Corruption Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The problem of corruption “is undeniably associated with development aid”.1 This is the 
case because foreign aid makes up the majority of public funds that are embezzled, 
misappropriated or diverted. The question that arises is how to address the problem of 
grand corruption in respect of foreign aid. One way of doing this is through legislation. 
According to Bean, countries with low levels of perceived corruption have enacted and 
enforced laws that limit corruption.2 Ndulo states that: 
The need to effectively curb corruption through legislation and effective institutions 
goes without saying because of the threat corruption poses to good governance, 
democracy and the rule of law and ultimately, it’s potential to hinder economic, 
social and political development.3 
The role that the law plays in fighting corruption is underscored by the excerpt below.  
If lawyers could draft laws that prevent corrupt behaviour, there would be no 
problem with corruption.4 
In the light of this, donors have called for more stringent efforts to combat corruption, 
including the improvement of legal regimes in recipient countries.5 
                                                          
1  Bean (2010) 800. 
2  Bean (2010) 789. 
3  Ndulo (2014) 7. 
4  Pope (2000) 269. 
5  See, for example, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2003) 6. 
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This chapter analyses the existing anti-corruption instruments of Zambia in an attempt to 
determine their adequacy and effectiveness as a response to corruption in foreign aid. 
3.2 International and Regional Anti-Corruption Instruments 
Whereas corruption used to be regarded as a domestic matter, it has become a problem of 
global concern.6  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), enacted in the US in 1977, is 
credited with having initiated the global anti-corruption movement.7 Its enactment 
prompted the adoption of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.8  The FCPA and the OECD Convention 
changed the traditional approaches to combating corruption by criminalising it.  However, 
these instruments were limited in scope and did not apply to corruption in bilateral and 
multilateral aid.9  This prompted the international community to advocate and adopt 
broader reaching anti-corruption instruments, including the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC), the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption (AU Convention) and the Southern African Development Community Protocol 
against Corruption (SADC Protocol). These instruments require states parties to take 
measures, including legislative and administrative measures, to ensure the implementation 
of their provisions.10 According to Lubinda: 
These multilateral instruments not only provide opportunities for regional, sub-
regional and global responses to corruption, they also provide a critical framework 
for local or national policy making.11 
                                                          
6  Williams & Beare (1999) 115. 
7  Williams & Beare (1999) 136. 
8  Williams & Beare (1999) 136. 
9  Bean (2010) 802. 
10  See Article 65(1) of UNCAC, Article 5 of the AU Convention and Article 7 of the SADC Protocol. 
11  Lubinda (2011) 5. 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Zambia is a State Party to these instruments. It is necessary therefore to examine the 
international legal framework as a yardstick against which the anti-corruption laws of 
Zambia may be evaluated. 
3.2.1 The United Nations Convention against Corruption 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the first anti-corruption 
agreement which is binding legally on a global scale. It was adopted formally in 2003 and 
entered into force in 2005. Unlike the FCPA and the OECD Convention, the provisions of 
UNCAC are broad enough to cover grand corruption because they extend to forms of 
corruption other than bribery.12 UNCAC is based on four pillars: prevention, criminalisation, 
international co-operation and asset recovery.13  
The discussion below focuses on specific provisions of UNCAC that extend the notion of 
corruption to grand corruption in foreign aid. 
3.2.1.1     Preventing Corruption in Foreign Aid 
Most measures taken to fight corruption are reactive rather than proactive. Corruption has 
to happen first before action is taken. Prosecuting corrupt public officials therefore is given 
more preference than prevention. However, the active prevention of corruption is more 
effective than reacting to allegations of corruption as they arise.14 Prevention of corruption 
in foreign aid is necessary to deny public officials the opportunity to embezzle aid funds and 
cut off corruption before it can take root. The adage that prevention is better than cure 
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holds true for corruption in foreign aid due to the challenges presented by its clandestine 
character and the difficulties of prosecuting high-level officials. 
UNCAC recognises the important role that prevention has to play and opens with it. Chapter 
I states that UNCAC aims to prevent and combat corruption by promoting and strengthening 
international co-operation, integrity, accountability and good management of public 
property.15 These principles are needed to promote a fairer and more effective public 
sector. They can assist in the fight against grand corruption in foreign aid by ensuring that 
public officials conduct themselves professionally and honestly and therefore will not 
embezzle public funds received through aid. 
Chapter II, which is dedicated to prevention, mandates states parties to develop and 
implement or maintain effective and co-ordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the 
participation of civil society and ensure the existence of integrity, accountability and 
transparency among their public officials.16 Measures to be taken under this chapter include 
requiring public officials to disclose assets and alternative sources of income.17 A system of 
disclosure would provide key evidence in a prosecution or for asset forfeiture purposes. 
Furthermore, it ensures transparency and accountability in public officials’ handling of 
public funds and acts as a deterrent to theft of aid.  
The establishment of independent anti-corruption bodies is another preventive measure 
provided for under this chapter.18 The role that such bodies can play in preventing theft of 
foreign aid cannot be overstated. According to Brunelle-Quraishi, these bodies “are the 
                                                          
15  Article 1(a)-(c) of UNCAC. 
16  Articles 5 & 8 of UNCAC. 
17  Article 8(5) of UNCAC. 
18  Article 6 of UNCAC. 
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intermediary between government and public opinion”.19 The campaigns to raise awareness 
and educate the public on corruption undertaken by these bodies can go far to prevent 
corruption in foreign aid.  
Civil society can play a role also in preventing corruption in foreign aid by exerting pressure 
for political commitment against corruption and fulfilment of obligations under the 
Convention.  
3.2.1.2    Criminalisation of Corruption in Foreign Aid  
Criminalisation is an integral part of the anti-corruption strategy that complements the 
other efforts aimed at combating corruption.20 It serves the function of deterring would-be 
offenders from acting corruptly and punishing persons who engage in corrupt acts. Chapter 
III requires states parties to establish a number of offences in their domestic law, either by 
enacting new laws or amending existing laws, if the conduct in question has not been 
criminalised already in their domestic law.21 The conduct criminalised is wide enough to 
cover grand corruption.22 The offences created, which can address corruption in foreign aid, 
can be divided into two categories namely, crimes to deal with the theft of aid funds and 
crimes to deal with attempts to hide stolen aid funds or hinder investigations. 
The previous chapter illustrated that grand corruption in foreign aid is perpetrated mostly 
through embezzlement. Corrupt public officials line their pockets with funds that are meant 
for development, collude with private third parties for workshops and training that are not 
conducted, or divert the funds to other lesser priorities. UNCAC mandates states parties to 
                                                          
19  Brunelle-Quraishi (2011) 108. 
20  See Carr (2007) 231. 
21  Babu (2006) 9. 
22  Hechler (2011) 11. 
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criminalise the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of public funds by 
government officials.23 Extending the notion of corruption to include embezzlement of 
public funds is a step forward in addressing corruption in foreign aid. This is because it casts 
a wider net to catch conduct relating to foreign aid that is criminal but fails to meet the 
requirements of other offences. 
Corrupt public officials are able to engage in corruption in foreign aid due to the access that 
their position grants them. The public official is granted authority, by virtue of his office, to 
disburse aid funds with considerable discretion. The public official uses his position as 
handler of aid funds to benefit himself during the discharge of his duties. An example is the 
public official who uses his position to award a contract through irregular tender 
procedures. Since the public official uses power that he would not ordinarily have but for his 
position, criminalising the abuse of authority of office is a potent tool for fighting grand 
corruption in foreign aid. It targets serious misconduct in the handling of aid monies which 
cannot be addressed satisfactorily by other offences. Disappointingly, UNCAC merely 
encourages states parties to criminalise the abuse of functions.24 
The clandestine character of corruption poses many challenges to its detection and 
investigation. Persons who can be witnesses often are involved in the commission of the 
crime,25 thus it remains confidential among the parties concerned with no one to report it. 
However, an official having property which is well beyond his lawful income is easily 
noticeable. Article 20 provides for the criminalisation of illicit enrichment and defines it as:  
                                                          
23  Article 17 of UNCAC. 
24  Article 19 of UNCAC. 
25  Perdriel-Vaissiere (2012) 4. 
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A significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot 
reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income. 
This offence helps in the fight against corruption in aid by circumventing the challenge of 
gathering evidence presented by the clandestine character of corruption. This offence does 
not require proof that the unexplained wealth is a result of corruption, because UNCAC 
presumes that unexplained wealth is derived from corrupt activities.26 In other words, it will 
be assumed that if property, held by a public official charged with handling aid funds cannot 
be justified by his lawful income was acquired through corrupt practices such as 
embezzlement of aid money. If assets of a public official dealing with aid funds are not 
commensurate with his lawful earnings, he would have to justify his unexplained wealth. 
The offence of illicit enrichment is a formidable tool against corruption in aid.  
Once foreign aid funds have been embezzled or acquired through the abuse of authority, 
corrupt public officials will attempt to conceal or disguise the illegal origins of the funds. This 
can be done by transferring the funds to offshore accounts, purchasing property such as 
houses and clothes, or investing the money in a cash-intensive business. Money laundering 
puts a safe distance between the stolen aid funds and the corrupt public officials, enabling 
them to enjoy the fruits of their crime. Empowering authorities to investigate and prosecute 
money laundering that is related to corruption enables them to trace, seize and confiscate 
property derived from corruption in foreign aid. Anti-money laundering preventive 
measures, such as reporting suspicious transactions by public officials or conducting 
enhanced customer due diligence for politically exposed persons (PEPs), can be leveraged 
also to fight corruption in foreign aid by preventing the legitimisation of corruptly obtained 
                                                          
26  Babu (2006) 15. 
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funds. Money laundering, as one of the offences committed in support of corruption, is 
criminalised by UNCAC.27 
The obstruction of justice, after theft of aid has been exposed, acts as a barrier to fighting 
corruption in aid effectively. Corruption in foreign aid normally is committed by high-ranking 
officials because they are the people entrusted with the power to handle aid.  Investigation 
and prosecution of such public officials is not an easy task because they have a tendency to 
use their influence to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and with the judiciary or law 
enforcement officials. Cases of corruption involving foreign aid therefore would not be 
investigated or prosecuted because of the power wielded by these persons. In the event 
that they somehow do go to trial, offenders likely would be acquitted even if there is 
overwhelming evidence that millions in aid money have been stolen. Thus, criminalising the 
obstruction of justice can ensure that corruption in foreign aid is investigated and 
prosecuted properly and thoroughly, thereby ensuring that officials who embezzle foreign 
aid funds do not escape punishment. The threat of punishment for engaging in aid 
corruption can serve to deter would be offenders. The obligation on states parties to create 
this offence is mandatory.28  
Corrupt public officials do not conceal stolen aid funds through money laundering only, but 
also make use of family and friends. Accounts can be opened in the names of relatives or 
friends or the funds simply can be deposited in their existing personal accounts. UNCAC 
encourages the criminalisation of intentional concealment or continued retention of 
                                                          
27  Article 23 of UNCAC. 
28  Article 25 of UNCAC. 
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property derived from corrupt acts with the knowledge of its illegal source.29 This offence is 
meant really to reach third parties who did not partake in the embezzlement of the foreign 
aid but who knowingly hide or keep the embezzled funds. The threat of punishment might 
have a deterrent effect on friends and relatives that the corrupt official seeks to rely on and 
might prevent corruption in aid if the official is afraid of the risks involved in other means of 
concealment, such as money laundering. 
UNCAC provides for liability for inchoate offences of corruption.30 Inchoate liability, in 
contrast to liability for predicate offences, requires the criminalisation of conduct that has 
embarked on a path to cause harm but in fact has not caused the harm. A public official can 
incur criminal liability even though the embezzlement of foreign aid or abuse of authority to 
benefit from aid funds has not been completed.31 The conduct of the public official is 
deemed criminal without actual harm being done because the harm that would have 
occurred is that which the law aims to prevent.32 For example, a Minister who in 1996, had 
disregarded tender awarding procedures for a government printing contract was dismissed 
after he attempted to cash a cheque worth more than K200 million written out in his name 
rather than the name of the printers.33 
3.2.1.3    Co-operating against Corruption in Foreign Aid 
UNCAC provides for promoting and strengthening international co-operation for effective 
law enforcement. States parties are encouraged to co-operate with one another in every 
                                                          
29  Article 24 of UNCAC. 
30  Article 27(3) of UNCAC. 
31  Strader (2006) 13. 
32  Burchell  (2013) 517. 
33  See Momba (no date). 
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area of the fight against corruption, including prevention, investigation and prosecution.34 
Article 44 provides for the extradition of offenders. This ensures that individuals who 
engage in corruption in foreign aid are no longer able to escape their home country and live 
abroad without fear of prosecution. Renwen & Ju point out that UNCAC goes a long way in 
trying to advance co-operation by creating substantial relationships amongst the states 
parties.35 International co-operation can be a vital tool in combating grand corruption in 
foreign aid, considering the fact that underdeveloped countries often lack the resources to 
conduct investigations and gather evidence in the countries where embezzled funds have 
been stashed. Given this transnational character of grand corruption, the encouragement of 
international co-operation is commendable and could reduce the absolute amount of grand 
corruption in aid. 
3.2.1.4    Recovering Foreign Aid Lost to Corruption 
As discussed in the previous chapter, most of the aid that is stolen is stashed away in 
overseas accounts or invested in property abroad. UNCAC provisions on asset recovery were 
ground-breaking because for the first time it became possible to rely on international anti-
corruption law to recover stolen assets.36 States parties should: 
[A]fford one another the widest measure of cooperation and assistance in this 
regard.37 
                                                          
34  Article 43 of UNCAC. 
35  Renwen & Ju (2010) 271. 
36  Babu (2006) 22. 
37  Article 51 of UNCAC. 
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Collaborative asset recovery can go a long way to help fight grand corruption in foreign aid 
by ensuring that stolen funds are returned to their rightful owners and that the perpetrators 
do not continue to enjoy the fruits of their crime.  
States parties should require financial institutions to conduct enhanced customer due 
diligence in respect of persons who are public officials or have been entrusted with public 
functions, as well as persons close to them.38 In order to assist countries to recover assets 
stolen by corrupt government officials, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and the World Bank have developed the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative.39 
States parties are obligated to take measures that ensure the protection of witnesses40 and 
are encouraged to provide protection for whistleblowers.41 
3.2.2 The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
The African Union Convention (AU Convention) is a regional instrument which was adopted 
in 2003 and which entered into force in 2006. The objectives of the AU Convention are to 
prevent, punish, and detect corruption in both the public and private sectors, and to 
promote international co-operation.42 This accords with measures advocated by the global 
anti-corruption movement. It requires states parties to combat corruption by ensuring 
transparency and accountability in public affairs.43 
                                                          
38  Article 52(1) of UNCAC. 
39   StAR (2007). 
40  Article 32 of UNCAC. 
41  Article 33 of UNCAC. 
42  Article 2 of the AU Convention. 
43  Article 2 of the AU Convention. 
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Most of the offences criminalised under the AU Convention are similar to those contained in 
UNCAC. These include abuse of authority,44 illicit enrichment,45 concealment46 and money 
laundering.47 The Convention also deals with diversion of property. The diversion could be 
the channelling of the property to purposes for which it was not intended or using it to 
benefit the official himself or third parties.48 The AU Convention also prohibits use of funds 
acquired through corruption to finance political parties,49 unlike UNCAC which contains a 
weaker optional version.50 Diverting public funds to finance political parties, especially 
during elections, always has been a problem in Zambia. Powerful politicians use public 
funds, which mostly constitute foreign aid, to finance political campaigns and party 
expenses. The AU Convention contains a similar provision to UNCAC on inchoate offences.51 
States parties agree that public officials declare their assets at the time of assumption of 
office, during and after their term of office.52 States parties are obligated to ensure the right 
of access to any information that may be required to assist in the fight against corruption.53 
Other measures include mutual legal assistance and regional co-operation,54 asset 
recovery,55 whistle-blower and witness protection56 and extradition of offenders.57 
                                                          
44  Article 4(c) of the AU Convention. 
45  Article 5(1) & 8(1)(2) of the AU Convention. 
46  Article 4(1)(h) of the AU Convention. 
47  Article 6 of the AU Convention. 
48  Mwenda (2007) 24. 
49  Article 10 of the AU Convention. 
50  Article 7(3) of UNCAC. 
51  Article 4(1)(i) of the AU Convention. 
52  Article 7(1) of the AU Convention. 
53  Article 9 of the AU Convention. 
54  Articles 18 & 19 of the AU Convention. 
55  Article 16 of the AU Convention. 
56  Article 5(5) of the AU Convention. 
57  Article 15 of the AU Convention. 
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The provisions of the Convention are not limited to bribery, but extend to acts related to 
grand corruption. This makes it possible to address corruption in foreign aid. Traditionally, 
dishonesty in relation to aid was not regarded as corruption and thus could not be 
prosecuted. The potential to confront corruption in foreign aid effectively is strengthened 
by the fact that all the offences discussed, with the exception of illicit enrichment, are 
mandatory. 
3.2.3 The Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption 
The Southern African Development Protocol against Corruption (SADC Protocol) was 
adopted in 2001 and entered into force in 2005. The objectives of the SADC Protocol are to 
promote and strengthen development of anti-corruption mechanisms; to promote, facilitate 
and regulate co-operation among states parties to ensure effectiveness of anti-corruption 
measures; and to foster development and harmonisation of policies and domestic 
legislation of states parties relating to anti-corruption measures.58 The acts that constitute 
corruption are very broad and include the diversion of property by public officials,59 abuse 
of authority,60 and concealment of property derived from corruption.61 Attempts and 
conspiracies to commit any of these crimes are prohibited also.62 The SADC Protocol 
requires states parties to have measures that can be used to trace and freeze assets and to 
confiscate them where necessary.63 In instances where assets have been transferred to 
another location, the Protocol requires states parties to offer one another mutual 
                                                          
58  Article 2 of the SADC Protocol. 
59   Article 3(d) of the SADC Protocol. 
60  Article 3(c) of the SADC Protocol. 
61  Article 3(g) of the SADC Protocol. 
62  Article 3(h) of the SADC Protocol. 
63  Article 8(1)(a) & (b) of the SADC Protocol. 
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assistance.64 Corruption under the SADC Protocol is an extraditable offence,65 making it 
difficult for corrupt government officials to find refuge in other SADC countries. 
Provision is made for the most common form of corruption in foreign aid and extended to 
encompass other acts that are related to grand corruption. The provisions restrict the 
opportunities to conceal stolen aid funds, strengthening international co-operation to 
detect and prevent this. Measures to profit from embezzlement of aid can be thwarted 
through asset recovery and extradition of offenders. The provisions under this Convention 
are adequate to address corruption in foreign aid. 
3.3 Anti-Corruption Legislation in Zambia 
Gillespie applauds the conclusion of the various international anti-corruption instruments 
but concludes that the issues of corruption will be settled by states that have committed 
themselves to confronting the problem and not by some international forum.66 
International instruments provide only the minimum standards to fight corruption in foreign 
aid, but it remains up to Zambia to implement these standards. Domestication of these 
instruments is a step towards their implementation.  
Zambia is recognised as having made considerable progress in the fight against corruption.67 
The legal and institutional framework in Zambia is said to have been strengthened68 and 
designated authorities have been investigating and prosecuting corruption cases 
                                                          
64  Article 8(4) of the SADC Protocol. 
65  Article 9 of the SADC Protocol. 
66  Gillespie (2004) 120. 
67  Chêne (2014) 1. 
68  Chêne (2014) 1. 
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relentlessly, including those involving high-ranking officials in spite of a low conviction 
rate.69 
3.3.1 Background 
Anti-corruption efforts in Zambia go back far. Prior to independence from Great Britain, the 
principal anti-corruption law in Zambia was the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1916, which 
was read together with the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act of 1889 and the Prevention 
of Corruption Act of 1908.70 The Penal Code71 was the first post-independence law on 
corruption. The Code contains a provision criminalising the abuse of functions.72 However, 
this law was restricted to the public sphere and did not cover corruption cases in the private 
domain. In order to cure this defect, the Corrupt Practices Act73 was passed, making 
corruption an offence in both the private and public spheres and providing for the 
establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which was to spearhead the fight 
against corruption. This Act was repealed in 1996 by the Anti-Corruption Commission Act74 
which transformed the ACC into an independent body mandated to prevent and combat 
corruption in Zambia. 
In 2009, President Rupiah Banda launched the National Anti-Corruption Policy (NACP) to 
create a corruption-free nation, preserve public resources and ensure that all public and 
private institutions adopt a code of ethics.75 An extensive legislative review to strengthen 
the legal framework in Zambia was initiated in 2010 as part of the implementation of the 
                                                          
69  The prosecution of former President Rupiah Banda is one example. 
70  National Anti-Corruption Policy (2009). 
71  Penal Code Act, Cap 87 of the Laws of Zambia. 
72  Section 99 of the Penal Code Act. 
73  Corrupt Practices Act 14 of 1980. 
74  Anti-Corruption Commission Act 42 of 1996. 
75  National Anti-Corruption Policy (2009). 
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NACP. The following legislation was passed to this end: the Anti-Corruption Act (to replace 
the 1996 Act), the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act, the 
Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, and the Prohibition and Prevention of Money 
Laundering (Amendment) Act. 
3.3.2 The Anti-Corruption Act 3 of 2012 
Corruption in Zambian now is proscribed by the Anti-Corruption Act 3 of 2012. This Act 
succeeded the Anti-Corruption Act of 2010. One of the objectives of the current Act is to 
bring the law into conformity with the provisions of the regional and international 
instruments to which Zambia is a party.76 Zambia therefore meets its obligations to 
implement these instruments through domestication of their provisions. 
3.3.2.1    Prevention of Corruption in Foreign Aid 
The 2012 Act continues the existence of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) that was 
created under the 1980 Act.77 The ACC is an autonomous body tasked with preventing 
corruption in public and private institutions, investigating allegations or instances of 
corruption and other offences, and educating the public on corruption.78 The ACC is vested 
also with prosecutorial powers.79 Employees of the ACC are the only civil servants subject to 
asset declarations.80 As the body spearheading the fight against corruption in Zambia, the 
activities of the ACC are crucial to combating corruption in the aid context. For example, the 
ACC encourages whistleblowing which is essential to the discovery of corruption in foreign 
                                                          
76  Preamble of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2012. 
77  Section 4 of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2012. 
78  Section 6(1) of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2012. 
79  Section 6(1)(b)(ii) of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2012. 
80  Section 14 of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2012. 
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aid and has set up an online reporting mechanism to facilitate anonymous reporting of 
corruption. 
3.3.2.2    Criminalisation of Corruption in Foreign Aid 
Part III of the Act contains corrupt practices which are offences in Zambia. The discussion 
that follows focuses on those corrupt practices that are relevant to combating corruption in 
the aid context. 
The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 1996 provided for the crime of abuse of authority of 
office. In 2010, a new Anti-Corruption Act repealed this offence. The arguments used to 
justify removal of this offence were that it violated the presumption of innocence and that 
the Penal Code covers this offence adequately. However, the Anti-Corruption Act of 2012 
restores the abuse of authority of office clause. In terms of the section, if a public official 
takes a decision or action in any matter in which he or a third party has a direct or indirect 
interest, he is presumed to have misused or abused his office.81  
This offence serves to punish public officials who use their position to embezzle public 
funds. One might ask why have the crimes of embezzlement and abuse of authority when 
the two seemingly are the same? The difference between embezzlement and abuse of 
functions is that for the former the public official is in lawful possession of the foreign aid 
which he embezzles because it was entrusted to him, whereas for abuse of authority the 
public official is not entrusted with the aid and therefore does not have lawful possession of 
it but has access to it because of his position. The offence of abuse of authority thus covers 
instances where a public official embezzles, misappropriates or diverts foreign aid but 
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cannot be charged with the crime of embezzlement because his conduct does not meet its 
requirements of lawful possession of the aid funds and a trust relationship with the public to 
safeguard its interests in the aid. 
The Act also criminalises the possession of unexplained property. A public official whose 
lifestyle or property in his possession or under his control exceeds his legitimate income or 
who receives the benefit of services suspected to emanate from corruption is presumed to 
be guilty of this offence.82 A similar provision in the 1996 Act was the subject of debate and 
ultimately ended up being repealed by the 2010 Act. It was argued that the section was 
unconstitutional in so far as it reversed the burden of proof and placed it on the accused. 
The burden of proof is reversed by requiring the accused to explain how the excess wealth 
was acquired legitimately as opposed to merely requiring him to adduce evidence in 
explanation.83 It was argued that its presumption of liability upon proof of excessive wealth 
violated the presumption of innocence which is entrenched constitutionally in Zambia.84 
Repealing the section was not the right thing to do because this offence is a formidable tool 
in the fight against corruption in foreign aid. It boosts asset recovery by addressing the 
difficulties of proving that the funds or property that a public official has in his possession 
are products of corruption in aid. In addition, the Zambian Constitution recognises that laws 
can be enacted which place the burden of proof on the accused.85 Furthermore, there are 
similar provisions in a host of other Zambian statutes that allow for the reversal of the 
burden of proof.86 
                                                          
82  Section 22 of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2012. 
83  Pope (2000) 272. 
84  Section 18(2)(a) of the Constitution of Zambia, 1996. 
85  Section 18(12) of the Constitution of Zambia, 1996. 
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Another argument against the crime of unexplained wealth was that it violated the right to 
silence. Professor Mvunga considers that if the accused chooses to exercise this right, he 
would fail to meet his burden of proof, which would lead to his conviction.87 However, 
Ndulo argues that this right is not absolute and that the accused’s silence in instances which 
clearly call for an explanation from him should be factored into the persuasiveness of the 
prosecution’s evidence.88 
There is clearly a relationship between money laundering and corruption. Foreign aid 
money that has been embezzled or acquired through abuse of authority usually is laundered 
in attempts to legitimise it or hide its source. In addition to criminalising corruption in 
foreign aid through offences such as embezzlement, it is therefore also necessary to 
criminalise acts in support of corruption, such as money laundering. This improves the 
chances of combating corruption in foreign aid by reducing the opportunities of profiting 
from stolen aid funds. Money laundering is covered by the Act under the crime of 
concealment of property.89 
Embezzlement of foreign aid usually involves high-ranking public officials in positions of 
influence or with connections to influential people and these officials will use their influence 
or connections to impede the interests of justice. There are numerous reports of high-level 
officials interfering with the course of justice in cases of corruption in aid. In 2004, donors 
condemned the instruction from George Kunda, who was the Attorney General at the time, 
to the DPP not to prosecute the former MoH permanent secretary, Kashiwa Bulaya, who 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ministerial Code of Conduct Act 35 of 1994. 
87  Lusaka Times (2010).  See also Thomas Mumba and Others v The People which struck down section  
53(1) of the Corrupt Practices Act as a violation of the right to silence. 
88  Ndulo (2014) 43. 
89  Section 36 of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2012. 
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was charged with abuse of office relating to the awarding of a tender contract for the supply 
of HIV/AIDS nutritional supplements without following tender procedures.90 The MoH 
budget relies heavily on donor funds which partly cover the purchase of HIV/AIDS drugs. 
Obstruction of justice can result in corrupt public officials looting aid funds with impunity 
because they know that prosecution is unlikely. Corrupt public officials who steal aid funds 
and evade justice will continue to enjoy the proceeds of their crime. It is thus necessary to 
criminalise obstruction of justice to combat corruption in foreign aid. Section 31 of the Act 
does just that.  
Foreign aid must be accounted for to donors, and all transactions must be documented. 
When audits are carried out, accounting records must tally with bank statements. In order 
to avoid getting caught, public officials will go to great lengths to hide their involvement in 
embezzlement of foreign aid monies. The Act thus makes it a crime to conceal an offence by 
tampering with or omitting information from paper or electronic documents and electronic 
devices.91 This provision tries to ensure accountability and transparency in the handling of 
aid funds, thereby fighting corruption in aid. 
Witnesses can provide important information about corruption in aid, based on what they 
observed or because they have direct knowledge of the theft, misappropriation or diversion 
of aid funds. Such information can assist to prove intent to embezzle foreign aid or intent to 
obtain a benefit from the abuse of authority relating to the administration of foreign aid. 
Witnesses can be experts in forensic accounting also and thus can provide information 
about accounting for aid funds, unlike lay people. According to Henning & Radek, witness 
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testimony as to the defendant’s knowledge of impropriety of the transaction is perhaps 
more essential in public corruption cases than in any other white collar crime.92 Fighting 
corruption in foreign aid can be hindered if witnesses are induced to give false testimony on 
behalf of the accused or against the accused or abscond from the trial. Corruption of 
witnesses is a criminal offence under section 25 of the Act.93 Furthermore, witnesses who 
themselves bribe an accused in return for their testimony are also liable under this section. 
Perhaps this can be dealt with under the offence of obstruction of justice, but in instances 
where misconduct which is manifestly criminal does not meet the requirements of 
obstruction of justice, such as lack of active or passive gratification, then it can be dealt with 
under this offence.  
The harmful effects of corruption in foreign aid have been discussed in Chapter Two. 
Attempts and conspiracies to embezzle foreign aid or to abuse authority in order to benefit 
from the administration of foreign aid are criminalised also because it is this harm that 
would have occurred that the law aims to prevent.94 It should be noted that conspiracy is 
deemed to be interchangeable with or linked to the offence of preparation that is provided 
for under UNCAC. Thus, merely preparing for corruption in aid, such as opening an offshore 
bank account in which to deposit the aid funds after embezzling them, is criminalised.  
3.3.2.3    Adequacy of the Act 
The provisions criminalising corruption in the Anti-Corruption Act are very robust. The Act 
covers the controversial crimes of abuse of functions and illicit enrichment which allow the 
anti-corruption authorities to act against public officials who pocket aid money. The value of 
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these crimes cannot be overstated. They make it possible to prosecute a public official 
suspected of having enriched himself or herself corruptly in situations where witnesses or 
whistleblowers are unwilling or unable to come forward and provide information which 
could be used as evidence. 
The provision on asset disclosure is inadequate in-so-far as it pertains only to the ACC. 
Zambia is in breach of its obligation under the AU Convention to enact a law prohibiting the 
use of illegal or corruptly obtained funds to finance political parties. 
The terms embezzlement, diversion or misappropriation do not appear anywhere in the 
Anti-Corruption Act. The Act criminalises the corrupt acquisition of public property or 
revenue instead.95 This section is as close as the Act comes to criminalising the diversion, 
embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds. This is the position because it has been 
held that no separate crime of embezzlement exists in Zambia.96 Embezzlement is said to be 
covered under the offence of theft by public servant contained in the Penal Code.97 The Act 
is inadequate in-so-far as it does not provide for a separate offence of embezzlement, 
diversion or misappropriation despite this being the most common mode of corruption in 
aid. 
3.3.2.4    Effectiveness of the Act 
Earlier versions of the provisions that have been discussed were effective in prosecuting 
some corruption cases, such as that of former army commander, Geojago Musengule, in 
2009. Musengule and his co-accused, Amon Sibande, were convicted for irregularly 
                                                          
95  Section 34 of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2012. 
96  Paul Watson Katembele vs The People (1977) Z.R. 90 (S.C) 
97  Paul Watson Katembele vs The People. 
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awarding several business contracts to Base Chemicals. Musengule was sentenced to four 
years' imprisonment with hard labour while Sibande received three years' imprisonment. 
The duo had been charged with seven counts of abuse of authority of office, corrupt 
practices by a public officer and corrupt practices with a public officer contrary to the Anti-
Corruption Commission Act 42 of 1996. The Lusaka High Court dismissed an appeal in 2012 
and upheld the conviction on all counts.98 
The provision relating to asset declarations is merely decorative and has not proved to be 
effective. The five-year gap between declarations is so long that it defeats the purpose of 
having such a measure. 
The effectiveness of the provision on corruption related money laundering is undermined by 
the lack of recognition of self-laundering, that is, where the corrupt public officials launders 
the stolen aid himself. 
3.3.3 The Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act 4 of 2010  
This Act provides protection for persons who disclose conduct adverse to the public 
interest.99 Section 63 of the Anti-Corruption Act provides that individuals who blow the 
whistle on corruption are to be dealt with under this Act. The Public Interest Disclosure Act, 
in turn, specifies that its provisions apply to government agencies, private or public 
companies, institutions, any organisation, body or organ registered, established or 
                                                          
98  Lusaka Times (2012). 
99  Preamble to the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
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incorporated by any law.100 Its objective is to provide a framework within which public 
interest disclosures can be dealt with independently and rigorously.101 
The Act stipulates procedures in terms of which employees may disclose information 
regarding unlawful or irregular conduct of employers or fellow employees.102 In addition, 
clauses in contracts of employment which contradict the provisions of the Act are 
prohibited. The Act explicitly provides that such agreements would be null and void.103 
Furthermore, employers are prohibited from subjecting employees to any occupational 
detriment on account, or partly on account, of the employee having made a protected 
disclosure or a public interest disclosure.104 Witnesses and whistleblowers are covered 
sufficiently by entitling them to anonymity, compensation, relocation and employment 
reinstatements. 
The Act covers not only disclosures that are made formally but also disclosures that are 
revealed in the course of another case. Section 5 provides that where information that 
could amount to a public interest disclosure is divulged in the course of any proceedings of a 
court or tribunal, such court or tribunal is required to refer the information to an interested 
authority.105 It secures effective protection in this regard by ensuring that disclosures that 
are made to an investigating authority106 and anonymous disclosures107 fall within the 
category of protected disclosures. When making an anonymous disclosure, a whistle-blower 
must identify him or herself to the head of an investigating authority and request that his or 
                                                          
100  Section 10 of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
101  Preamble to the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
102  Ndulo (2014) 45. 
103  Section 4 of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
104  Section 42 of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
105  Section 5 of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
106  Section 11 of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
107  Section 12 of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
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her identity be kept confidential by said authority.108 This might appear to detract from 
anonymity, but the Act prohibits the investigating authority from disclosing the 
whistleblower’s identity.109 
The Act makes provision for disclosures concerning corrupt conduct. The whistle-blower 
makes this disclosure to the ACC in accordance with the Anti-Corruption Act and the 
disclosure must show the occurrence of corruption or its likelihood.110 
3.3.3.1   Adequacy of the Act 
Requiring the whistle-blower to show the occurrence of corruption or its likelihood places 
an onerous burden on him or her and might discourage disclosures. The Act ought to have 
made provision for disclosures based on prima facie evidence or suspicions. However, the 
use of the general term ‘‘irregular conduct’’ could make up for this as it “may be able to 
provide a holistic approach” and casts a wide net that can catch various conduct which 
might amount to corruption.111 
The provisions in respect of employees ensure that unlawful or irregular conduct is 
disclosed regardless of whether it was committed by high-level officials or employers or 
other employees at the whistleblower’s place of work. This is enhanced by entitling 
employees to compensation and employment reinstatement if they suffer any detriment 
due to the disclosure. 
The Act encourages whistleblowers to come forward and report corrupt or suspicious 
conduct without fear of repercussions by keeping their identity confidential through 
                                                          
108  Section 12(3) of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
109  Section 44 of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
110  Section 26 of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act. 
111  Ndulo (2014) 46. 
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anonymous disclosures. This serves to curb the unequal bargaining power of the employer 
as weighed against that of the employee, which inequality would discourage the employee 
from making a disclosure for fear of potential repercussions, such as a lawsuit for breach of 
contract. 
3.3.3.2   Effectiveness of the Act 
Data was unavailable as to the implementation of the Act therefore, its effectiveness cannot 
be assessed.  
Whistleblowers are necessary to unmask corruption which is clandestine in nature. It is 
difficult if not impossible to discover corruption without the assistance of whistleblowers. 
However, there was no protection for whistleblowers prior to the enactment of this Act. 
Individuals, therefore, had no assurances when making public disclosures and perhaps this 
contributed to the lack of discovery of corruption in aid. Offering protection to persons who 
disclose embezzlement of foreign aid will encourage individuals to come forward without 
fear of persecution. Protecting whistleblowers will promote transparency and accountability 
in the handling of foreign aid because the public will demand it when corruption in aid is 
brought to light. Whistleblowing has proved an effective tool in exposing and fighting 
corruption in aid, such as in the Ministry of Health scandal, where the theft of millions of aid 
funds was revealed through whistleblowing.112  
3.3.4 Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act 19 of 2010 
The confiscation and forfeiture of proceeds of crime in Zambia is regulated in a number of 
legislative enactments. The Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act (FPOCA) is the most 
                                                          
112  See Chapter Two for a discussion of this scandal. 
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comprehensive of them and provides for the tracing and confiscation any proceeds, benefit, 
or property derived from the commission of any serious offence, and to facilitate the tracing 
of any proceeds, benefit, and property derived from the commission of any serious 
offence.113 The Act is the domestication of the provisions relating to the forfeiture of 
proceeds of crime contained in the United Nations Convention against Corruption.114 In 
terms of section 68 of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act, the provisions of the FPOCA will 
apply to corruption offences. 
The procedures for tracing, seizing and preserving property that is liable to confiscation or 
forfeiture are contained in Part III of the Act. The police are empowered to apply for a 
warrant to search any premises and seize any tainted property or object reasonably 
believed to be of evidentiary value.115  
The Act provides for judicial restraining orders to preserve property that is liable to 
forfeiture or confiscation whether located domestically or abroad.116 The court may grant 
the order prior the charging of the suspect.117 Also, a restraining order made abroad may be 
registered in Zambia pursuant to this Act.118  
The court can issue production and inspection orders which compel a person to produce any 
property-tracking documents that are in his or her possession, notwithstanding any law 
prohibiting disclosure.119 
                                                          
113  Preamble to the FPOCA. 
114  Preamble to the FPOCA. 
115  Sections 35 & 37 of the FPOCA. 
116  Section 42 of the FPOCA. 
117  Sections 38(3) & 51(1)(a) of the FPOCA. 
118  Section 53 of the FPOCA. 
119  Sections 57-63 of the FPOCA. 
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The Act stipulates that restraint, forfeiture and confiscation procedures are to be executed 
through civil procedure, barring offences which are dealt with under criminal law.120 
The Act empowers the prosecutor to apply for confiscation or forfeiture orders against a 
person convicted of a serious offence.121 The prosecutor can apply also for a forfeiture order 
in an instance where the suspect has absconded.122 The court is empowered to issue such 
orders123 or direct that the convict pays an amount which is equivalent to the value of the 
property.124 The court may infer that property is tainted if the convict acquired it after the 
commission of an offence. This inference may be made where the increase in value of the 
convict’s property is not commensurate with his lawful sources of income.125 Forfeiture and 
confiscation orders issued by foreign courts may be registered in Zambia.126 
3.3.4.1    Adequacy of the Act 
The FPOCA makes comprehensive provision for both conviction and non-conviction based 
forfeiture. Investigative authorities thus are given enough power to prevent corrupt public 
officials from concealing or disposing of assets.  
The extension of the notion of property to include the proportionate value of any property 
into which the proceeds have been converted or intermingled provides a potent tool for 
recovering proceeds of corruption.127  
                                                          
120  Sections 33 & 78 of the FPOCA. 
121  Section 4(1) of the FPOCA. 
122  Section 9(1) of the FPOCA. 
123  Sections 17 & 19 of the FPOCA. 
124  Section 15 of the FPOCA. 
125  Section 10(2)(c) of the FPOCA. 
126  Sections 18 & 26 of the FPOCA. 
127  Definition of proceeds of crime under Section 2 of the FPOCA. 
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This Act is an adequate tool in the fight against public officials who derive economic profit 
from theft of foreign aid funds. 
3.3.4.2    Effectiveness of the Act 
The negative consequences of corruption in foreign aid discussed in Chapter Two show the 
importance of recovering stolen aid funds. The FPOCA is relatively new still but the 
effectiveness of having provisions for asset forfeiture can be seen already. For example, in 
August 2014, the ACC seized properties owned by Henry Kapoko, a former public official in 
the MoH, who allegedly was implicated in the corruption scandal involving foreign aid.128 
Despite laws that criminalise corruption and provide lengthy prison sentences for offenders, 
corrupt public officials engage in corruption in foreign aid still and enjoy their ill-gotten 
gains. It is therefore necessary to reach the funds that are stolen and the assets that are 
generated by corrupt practices. According to Ndulo, the financial incentives which 
encourage and sustain corruption are diminished by forfeiture.129 The threat of confiscation 
of the proceeds of corruption contained in one of the objectives of the Act, should serve 
deter to public officials who are tempted to embezzle aid funds.130 
The acquittal of Kapoko and his co-accused highlight the pitfalls of conviction based 
procedures. Failure to obtain a conviction results in corrupt public officials profiting from 
criminal acts and continuing to embezzle aid funds because conviction based procedures are 
dependent on the conviction of the accused. It is therefore a welcome relief that the Act 
includes non-conviction based (civil) asset forfeiture procedures. This can assist in fighting 
                                                          
128  Lusaka Times (2014). 
129  Ndulo (2014) 73. See Chapter Two. 
130  Ndulo (2014) 72. 
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corruption in aid and recovering funds that have been embezzled because the procedure 
does not depend on the conviction of the accused, as has been shown by the confiscation of 
Henry Kapoko’s property despite his acquittal. Reported instances of corruption in foreign 
aid show perpetrators to be high-level officials who are too influential or powerful to 
prosecute successfully. Thus civil forfeiture proceedings deal also with the problem that 
prosecuting such offenders presents. 
The crimes contained in the Act could be very effective in combating corruption in foreign 
aid, but they need to be supplemented by diversion and money laundering in the context of 
corruption. 
3.3.5 Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act 14 of 2001 
The Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PPMLA) is the principal statute 
dealing with money laundering in Zambia. Section 7 of the PPMLA prohibits money 
laundering. The PPMLA initially defined money laundering in relation to proceeds of illegal 
activity131 which in turn was defined as any activity carried out anywhere at any time that is 
recognised as a crime in Zambia.132 
According to Mwenda, this definition of money laundering in relation to proceeds of illegal 
activity meant the PPMLA regarded all crimes as predicate offences for money 
laundering.133 Embezzlement of foreign aid or corrupt practices involving foreign aid would 
then be covered under this Act because corruption is recognised as crime in Zambia.  
                                                          
131  Section 2 of the PPMLA. 
132  Section 2 of the PPMLA. 
133  Mwenda (2005). 
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The PPMLA was amended in 2010 and the definition of money laundering was replaced. The 
amended PPMLA defines money laundering in relation to proceeds of crime.134 The 
Amendment Act replaces the definition of proceeds of crime which it defines as property or 
benefit derived from the activities involving a crime and includes property derived from an 
illegal activity whose form is later changed.135 It is submitted that the arguments of Mwenda 
apply to these amendments and, therefore, that the Act is still capable of fighting corruption 
in aid because corruption remains a crime in Zambia. Persons who make disclosures in 
compliance with this Act are protected under the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of 
Whistleblowers) Act.136 The definition of property provided under section 2 of the PPMLA 
has been widened by the amendment to include proportional value of property to 
substitute for missing or intermingled property.137 
3.3.5.1    Adequacy of the Act 
The link between corrupt practices and money laundering is undeniable. Corrupt public 
officials are able still to transact with the world even if there is overwhelming evidence that 
their wealth was obtained illicitly, thereby enabling them to hide or profit from corrupt 
practices related to foreign aid. This can be seen through the provision of private banking 
services to politically exposed persons (PEPs) in places such as Switzerland, the Isle of Man 
or the Cayman Islands, which enables these kleptocrats to stash away embezzled funds. 
Corrupt public officials also embezzle aid funds through the purchase of property or 
investment in cash-intensive businesses. The case of Henry Kapoko discussed earlier 
provides an example of this. Kapoko was charged with money laundering in addition to a 
                                                          
134  Section 3(b) of the Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act 44 of 2010. 
135  Section 3(c) of the Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act. 
136  Section 14 of the Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act. 
137  Section 3(d) of the Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act. 
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number of corruption offences. He is alleged to have laundered the money through the 
purchase of five properties which included a lodge.138 
The court in the case of Stella Chibanda stated that the aim of the Act was to keep dirty 
money dirty.139 The provisions of the Act regarding preventing, detecting and deterring the 
transfer of funds that are derived from crime are robust enough to cover this. Thus the Act 
can assist in combating corruption in foreign aid by preventing the legitimation of foreign 
aid funds that are stolen or acquired through corrupt practices. The inclusion of 
proportional value of property to substitute for missing or intermingled property will act to 
ensure that aid funds that have been converted into another form are restored. 
3.3.5.2   Effectiveness of the Act 
The effectiveness of the principal anti-money laundering statute was captured in the Kapoko 
case, where the prosecution relied on the provisions of the PPMLA to obtain a confiscation 
order from the court.140 
3.4 Observations 
The indicators used to determine whether UNCAC addresses grand corruption apply to 
Zambian anti-corruption laws since UNCAC serves as yardstick against which they are 
measured. The first indicator is the recognition that corruption is not limited to bribery but 
extends to the offences identified above, which incorporate elements of grand corruption. 
Zambia provides for most of these offences, thus the law can be said to be adequate and 
                                                          
138  Post Newspaper (2012). 
139  Stella Chibamba and Nico Farms Ltd v The Commissioner, Drug Enforcement Commission and the  
Attorney General and Stanbic Bank Zambia Ltd 2003/HP/0242. 
140  Lusaka Times (2014). 
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have the potential to address effectively grand corruption in foreign aid. Unfortunately, the 
effectiveness of the law is weakened by the lack of a separate offence of embezzlement. 
The second indicator is the recognition of the importance of asset recovery. This addresses 
grand corruption in two ways. Firstly, international co-operation in preventing, detecting 
and deterring the transfer of illicitly acquired funds limits the opportunities for public 
officials to stash away corruptly acquired aid monies. Secondly, international co-operation in 
extraditing offenders and repatriating stolen aid funds limits the gains from corruption and 
increases the risks involved in engaging in corrupt practices.141  
The laws addressing the problem of corruption are robust and Zambia does a good job of 
implementing the other provisions relating to grand corruption, such as establishment of an 
autonomous anti-corruption body. However, the rare conviction of high-ranking officials or 
even the non-serving of sentences in instances where they are convicted, acts as a barrier to 
the effectiveness of these laws. Furthermore, the law does not provide a procedure for 
donors to require or force Zambia to prosecute senior government officials even where it is 
clear that they have stolen millions in aid funds. 
                                                          
141  Hechler et al (2011) 12. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
4.1 Conclusion 
The study was conducted to examine the relationship between foreign aid and corruption in 
Zambia. There is a causal relationship between foreign and corruption. Foreign aid provides 
breeding ground for corruption by freeing up resources or creating new ones which 
exacerbates existing corruption. Corruption negatively impacts on aid by diverting resources 
from their rationale.  Foreign aid is considered to be an important source of revenue and 
resources in Zambia and it has been provided with a view to alleviating extreme poverty in 
the country. However, foreign aid has provided public officials with opportunities to plunder 
the nation’s resources that have been freed up by aid funds and this has perpetuated the 
existing corruption. Large sums of aid not only have exacerbated existing corruption, but 
also have bred it by providing public officials with readily available funds for which they do 
not have to account. Aid disbursements have served only to encourage dependency, 
decrease accountability and reduce creativity.  
Providing foreign aid to alleviate poverty is a noble goal, but controversy exists as to 
whether aid has been effective in bringing economic and social development to Zambia. 
Despite mechanisms such as conditionality being put in place to ensure its success, foreign 
aid disbursed in Zambia to foster conditions that will promote long-term, self-sustaining 
economic growth has not been particularly successful in eliminating or even reducing 
poverty. This has been proved by the decline in GDP per capita even as aid was being 
delivered, and the situation has not improved much in recent times. Donors have struggled 
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to safeguard against the misuse of foreign aid and ensure that aid funds are spent wisely. 
Rather than alleviating poverty, aid has contributed to keeping 60% of the population below 
the poverty line by perpetuating and exacerbating corruption. Thus, foreign aid may be a 
worthwhile endeavour but simply donating money is not in itself a solution. 
Despite various studies demonstrating that it has not been particularly productive, Zambia 
continues to receive billions in foreign aid. Such aid has minimal positive effects and permits 
a handful of senior officials to enrich themselves at the expense of ordinary citizens. Grand 
corruption in the form of diversion, embezzlement and misappropriation of aid has been 
recognised as having a negative impact on aid effectiveness due to the fungibility of the 
resources provided. Donors have resolved to tackle the problem of corruption in aid. They 
have paid more attention to cases in which aid funds have been misused and have not 
reached their intended recipients, unlike in the past when donors simply disregarded 
corruption by senior public officials in favour of political considerations. 
The legal framework for fighting grand corruption in foreign aid is mostly in place in Zambia, 
although there are some gaps and implementation challenges that still exist. Providing laws 
that have a broad reach is commendable, but the limits of the law must be recognised. 
Fighting corruption in aid necessitates the use of multifaceted measures which require 
political will and leadership. 
4.2 Recommendations 
4.2.1 Pre-emptive Measures 
Passionate declarations about zero tolerance of corruption in themselves are not sufficient 
to tackle the problem. A holistic approach that goes beyond political slogans and moral 
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campaigns is needed to fight grand corruption in aid. Furthermore, the commitment 
required from political leaders and key stakeholders needs to be long term to prevent the 
possibility of co-ordination failure. The will to see strategies through to their completion or 
to sustain co-ordination among stakeholders often is lacking. 
Investigating and prosecuting heads of state and senior government officials who are 
responsible for the theft of aid funds will remain a challenge as long as the decision to 
prosecute rests in the hands of those very officials. A reform of the entire judiciary is 
necessary to ensure its independence and efficiency. 
Whistleblowers apparently brought allegations of corruption to the attention of donors 
before the MoH scandal broke. Donors allegedly requested proof from the whistleblowers 
before they could follow up on the allegations. Donors rather should have followed up on 
the allegations or requested the ACC to do so. There must be systematic follow up of 
corruption allegations made by whistleblowers, if any headway is to be made in the fight 
against corruption in foreign aid. 
There is a dearth in the information available on grand corruption in foreign aid. Statistics 
on corruption cases involving foreign aid should be collected and published as well as other 
information pertaining to foreign aid. 
Civil society plays an important role in increasing awareness of corruption in the 
administration of aid. It can ensure that public officials are accountable to the people they 
serve and that there is transparency in handling of aid funds. Thus there is a need to 
improve the relationship between government and civil society when it comes to 
information sharing. 
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Most of the staff mandated to investigate and prosecute grand corruption in foreign aid lack 
the requisite investigative and prosecution skills. Provision should be made for effective and 
efficient training of officials involved in anti-corruption activities. 
Foreign aid is still used as a means to further donor interests and thus little has been done 
to tighten aid standards to reduce grand corruption. Donors are preoccupied with ensuring 
that Zambia adopts economic and political policies that they espouse, rather than serving 
the needs of the people and the Zambian economy. Rethinking the ways in which aid is 
administered and delivered can play a significant role in the reduction of grand corruption in 
the aid context.  
4.2.2 Anti-Corruption Laws 
The crime of embezzlement is essential in cases of grand corruption in foreign aid. Zambia 
needs to introduce a separate offence of embezzlement in fulfilment of its international 
obligations. 
The lack of legislation on access to information affects levels of transparency and 
accountability. Government has been promising to enact a law dealing with this, but yet has 
to do so. There is a need to speed up the process of adopting a law on access to 
information. This law will assist in fighting corruption in foreign aid by increasing the levels 
of transparency and accountability in its management. 
The recent scandals of corruption that have dominated news reports have been perpetrated 
by a host of different public officials and persons linked to public officials. The legal 
provisions on asset declarations in the Anti-Corruption Act and the Parliamentary and 
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Ministerial Code of Conduct Act are inadequate. Asset declarations must be extended to all 
public officials and politically exposed persons. 
Political corruption is rampant in Zambia. Often, public funds are used to finance the ruling 
political party’s expenditures. The prohibition of the use of illegal or corruptly obtained 
funds to finance political parties must be included in Zambia’s anti-corruption laws.
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